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WAIVER OF TRIAL JURY IN FELONY CASES IN KENTUCKY
THE PROBLEM
The federal constitution and all the state constitutions have pro-
visions that guarantee an accused the right to a jury trial in a felony
case.' Thus, there is adequate assurance that he will not be forced
to have his fate decided without a jury. Should the accused likewise
have assurance that he will not be forced to have his fate decided
by a jury? In short, if an accused after consulting with his attorney,
feels that he cannot possibly get a jury that will give him a fair trial,
should he nevertheless be forced to have his case placed in their
hands?
WAVER IN GEN RAL
Some jurisdictions have legislation which permits an accused to
waive trial by jury in felony cases after pleading "not guilty."2 The
jurisdictions having no express written provision concerning waiver
are divided as to whether waiver will be permitted.8 Historically, in
the absence of express statutory authority an accused in such cases
could not waive a jury trial.4 Some of the courts based their holding
on the notion that the state has an interest in preserving the lives
and liberties of its citizens. 5 Other courts held that a judge sitting
alone was without jurisdiction to hear a felony case.6
Both propositions have been repudiated, however. Other juris-
dictions having neither constitutional nor statutory sanctions have
rejected both arguments and have permitted an accused to waive
the jury in felony cases. 7
'14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 128 (1938).
2 State v. Rankin, 102 Conn. 46, 127 AH. 916 (1925); People v. Henderson,
246 Mich. 481, 224 N.W. 628 (1929).3 For cases permitting waiver see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276
(1930); People v. Scudieri, 863 ill. 84, 1 N.E.2d 225 (1936); People v. Fisher,
340 N11. 250, 172 N.E. 722 (1930); Fluty v. State, 224 Ind. 652, 71 N.E.2d 565
(1947); Rose v. State, 177 Md. 577, 10 A.2d 617 (1940); State v. Hernandez,
46 N.M. 134, 123 P.2d 387 (1942); State v. Haas, 69 S.D. 204, 8 N.W.2d 569
(1943). For cases refusing waiver, see State v. Porter, 176 La. 673, 146 So.
465 (1938); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 153 N.E. 537 (1926);
State. v. Bresse, 326 Mo. 885, 33 S.W.2d 919 (1930); Cancemi v. People, 18
N.Y. 128 (1858); State v. Ellis, 210 N.C. 170, 185 S.E. 662 (1936), State v.
Karunsky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P.2d 390 (1938); State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664,
200 N.W. 638 (1924).
431 Am. Jur. Jury § 50 (1958).
5 State v. Porter, 176 La. 673, 146 So. 465 (1933); Cancei v. People, 18
N.Y. 128 (1858); State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403 (1877).6 Commonwealth v. Rowe 257 Mass. 172, 153 N.E. 537 (1926); State v.
Karunsky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P.2d 390 (1938).7 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); People v. Fisher, 340 Ill.
250, 172 N.E. 722 (1930).
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WAIVER IN KENTUCKY
Where the Plea is "Not Guilty"
The Constitution of Kentucky merely provides that the accused
has a right to a jury trial. The provision has not been interpreted
as being mandatory. The Kentucky Constitution, section 7 provides,
"The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right
thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be
authorized by this constitution." There are no pertinent modifica-
tions. Kentucky Revised Statutes section 29.015, formerly Kentucky
Statutes section 2252, provides, "A petit jury in the circuit court shall
consist of twelve persons.., but the parties to any action or prosecu-
tion, except for a felony, may agree to a trial by a lesser number of
persons." Thus, Kentucky has a constitution which guarantees the
right to a trial by jury, has no constitutional provisions either per-
mitting or prohibiting waiver, and has a statute which provides that
an accused shall not be tried by a lesser number of persons than
twelve in a felony case. Reading the statute literally it seems defi-
nitely to prohibit waiver of the jury.8 It says that an accused shall
not be tried by less than twelve in a felony case, and certainly where
the accused waives the jury, the judge sitting alone is "less than
twelve." But, looking at the statute from a different perspective it
would appear to provide only that an accused must have twelve
jurors if he elects to have a jury.9 The statute should not be read
to prohibit the accused from waiving the entire panel. To group
the judge and jury together in reaching a conclusion that the judge
sitting alone is "less than twelve" is like adding apples and oranges;
they are simply different entities.
But, that seems to be exactly what the Kentucky court has done.
The first case which brought up the question of waiver in Kentucky
involved a jury composed of less than twelve. Both the Common-
wealth and the defendant in Branham v. Commonwealth'0 agreed to
a jury of seven. The defendant was convicted. On appeal the con-
viction was set aside and the cause remanded for a new trial, the
court holding that Kentucky Statutes section 2252, quoted supra, was
mandatory and therefore an accused could not agree to a jury of less
than twelve. This ruling was subsequently affirmed in Jackson v.
Commonwealth" where the panel consisted of eleven jurors. The
only difference in the two cases was that Jackson did not object to
8 See Moreland, "Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases in Kentucky," 21
Ky. L. J. 1, 26 (1932).
9 Cf. Munsell v. People, 222 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1950).
10 209 Ky. 784, 273 S.W. 489 (1925).
11221 Ky. 823, 299 S.W. 983 (1927).
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the panel after a juror had been excused due to illness. That is, the
jury of eleven in Jackson was due to inadvertence, whereas the jury
in Branham was composed of seven by agreement.
McPerkin v. Commonwealth12 was the first case in Kentucky to
involve a genuine attempt at waiver. The defendant was a Negro
accused of raping a white woman. Through counsel he asked that
the jury be waived. The trial court denied his request and the ac-
cused was convicted by a jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, holding that it was not error for the trial court to deny
the request for waiver and cited the Branham and Jackson opinions
as authority for the proposition that "the right to trial by jury is a
constitutional right that cannot be waived." In other words, it is a
constitutional right that cannot be waived because the statute says
it cannot be waived.13
The final word from the Kentucky court on waiver in cases where
the accused pleads "not guilty" came in Tackett v. Commonwealth.14
The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to two years in the
penitentiary. On appeal the record did not show that the verdict
was found by a jury. The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of
the omission and remanded the case for a new trial, citing Branham,
Jackson and McPerkin as its authority. Thus, a jury cannot be waived
in a felony case where the plea is "not guilty" even though both the
prosecution and the judge agree with the accused and his counsel
that the judge should decide both the facts and the law.
While Kentucky was generally considered a jurisdiction which
would not permit waiver before the Tackett case,15 it should be noted
that the Kentucky court could have permitted waiver in that case by
applying accepted legal principles. It could have 1) interpreted
section 21.015 as meaning that an accused must have a jury of
twelve only if he elects to be tried by a jury, as noted supra,
2) distinguished the McPerkin case on the ground that the Common-
wealth did not agree to the waiver'6 and 8) decided that the right
to jury trial as guaranteed by the constitution is not a part of the
framework of government but a personal right that may be waived.17
12 236 Ky. 528, 33 S.W.2d 622 (1930).
13 Moreland, supra note 8, at 26.
14 320 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1959).
"
5 Roberson, New Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure § 106 (2d ed.
197 Some jurisdictions which permit waiver require that the prosecution agree
to the waiver. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942);
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
17 The Kentucky court has not been faced with a decision on this point
since it has relied on Ky. Rev. Stat. § 29.015. For opinions holding that the right
is personal see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); People v. Fisher,
340 Il. 250, 172 N.E. 722 (1930).
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Where the Plea is "Guilty"
The constitutional guarantee of trial by jury applies only to the
issue of guilt or innocence since the ancient mode of trial by jury
did not include having the jury set the sentence.' Thus, it is strictly
statutory as to whether the accused may be sentenced by the judge
where he pleads "guilty." In Kentucky, prior to 1952 the controlling
statute 9 was interpreted to permit a judge to fix the degree of punish-
ment only: 1) where the jury found the defendant guilty as pleaded
and the punishment was fixed definitely by law, leaving no discretion
on the part of the judge20 or 2) where there was a maximum and
minimum penalty provided for the offense and the judge imposed the
minimum.2' In the latter situation the accused could not be heard
to say that he was prejudiced since the punishment was the minimum
that the jury could have given.22
In 1952 the statute was amended, 2 3 and it has since been inter-
preted to permit the judge to fix the degree of punishment without
the intervention of a jury when the following conditions precedent
are met: 1) the accused pleads "guilty"24 2) the crime is a non-
capital offense,' 5 8) the accused is represented by counsel,.20 and
4) both the prosecutor and defense counsel consent.27
EVALUATION
From the Standpoint of the Accused
The Kentucky statute which permits an accused to plead guilty
and have the court set his sentence is sound law. There is no sense
IsWard v. Hurst, 300 Ky. 464, 189 S.W.2d 594 (1945).
19 Prior to 1952 Ky. Crim. Code § 258 provided:
[I]n "verdicts of guilty" or "for the Commonwealth," the jury shall
fix the degree of punishment to be inflicted unless the same be fixed
by law.
20Bates v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 338, 227 S.W. 472 (1921).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
2 3 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.130 (1959) now provides:
[U]pona verdict of "guilty' or a plea of guilty or "for the Common-
wealth, by agreement of the Commonwealths attorney and the
defendant, wi advice of an attorney, the court may, within its
discretion, and without the intervention of a jury, fix the degree
of punishment within the periods or amounts prescribed by law,
except in cases involving an offense punishable by death....2 4 Holt v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1957).
25 See Thomas v. Maggard, 313 S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1958), holding that a
sentence set by a judge without a jury in a capital punishment case is erron-
eous but not void and thus the accused is not entitled to release through habeas
corpus proceedings.26 ing v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1955).
27 Holt v. Commonwealth, supra note 24.
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in impanelling a jury to do a useless act. There is no issue of fact
to decide where the accused pleads "guilty." Further, there is noth-
ing to be gained in having the jury set a sentence that both the
accused and prosecution have agreed on. The accused has adequate
assurance that his rights will be protected, since he must be rep-
resented by an attorney. 28
Similarly, the decision as to whether the accused may waive the
jury in cases where he pleads "not guilty" should be left to the
accused and his counsel. Since the right to trial by jury is generally
recognized as having been instituted as a protection to the accused2"
he should be permitted to choose the manner of trial which will be to
his greatest advantage. Then, if the accused is satisfied that he will
be better protected without a jury, waiver should be permitted.
This might occur in the following situations:
1. Complex Cases. Cases involving income tax evasion and stock
market transactions sometime are very complicated on their facts.
In such a situation the accused may feel that a judge is more capable
of understanding the case and consequently will have a better basis
for reaching a decision. In one federal case, 0 the accused felt that
his case was too complicated for both the jury and counsel, so he
waived both. The Court permitted it, saying:
The short of the matter is that an accused, in the exercise of a free
and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the
court, may waive trial by jury, and so likewise may be competently
and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assistance of
counsel. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent an accused
from choosing to have his fate tried before a judge without a jury
even though, in deciding what is best for himself, he follows the
guidance of his own wisdom and not that of a lawyer.31
2. Faster Disposition. No time would be spent in selecting a jury.
To an innocent accused who cannot post bail this is very important,
for it means that he will spend a minimum of time behind bars.
3. Fuller Presentation of the Case under Relaxed Rules of Pro-
cedure. Since there is no jury, the court will not be as strict in ad-
mitting or excluding evidence. The accused will have an opportunity
to have his case presented to the fullest extent without any "show."
Further, the judge would not have to be in a hurry to return the
verdicts, as might a jury, who in certain instances might be anxious
"to get home to supper." The judge could hold the case under ad-
visement for several days, meanwhile hearing other cases. Judge
2s Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537 (1948).
29 See People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 257, 172 N.E. 722, 725 (1930).30 Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
81 Id. at 275.
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Bond of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore city had this to say about
a criminal trial without a jury:
The trials are usually less formal than trials before juries, and, of
course, quicker. There is no delay in selection of the tribunal, often
opening statements are omitted as unnecessary, the evidence is more
direct and concise, and there are fewer objections or other inter-
ruptions. The judges as they go along ask questions to clear up mat-
ters for themselves. They may, without inconvenience, interrupt
a trial and hold it for days until other witnesses they might like to
hear are hunted up. They may hold it under advisement for days,
after all the evidence is in, to reflect upon it. Sometimes the exam-
ination of witnesses suggests the existence of additional evidence
which may go right to the point of final difficulty in the judge's
mind, and where the evidence may be on the side of the accused the
judge is especially careful to bring it into the case. I have seen great
benefit come to the accused from a long suspension to get such
additional evidence.aa
4. The Possibility of Prejudiced Jurors. While the law does not,
and should not, guarantee an accused a sympathetic jury, it should
at the same time, ensure that he does not have his case tried before a
jury that is prejudiced against him. There are certain circumstances
that may arise which will tend to cause any jury to be prejudiced
against the accused:
A. The newspaper, radio and television coverage may have been
extensive. In such a situation the accused must accept the fact that
most, if not all, of the jurors have learned of the case and have prob-
ably formed an opinion as to his guilt or innocence. There is also
the factor to be considered that it is difficult for a prospective juror
to admit publicly, on voir dire, that he has been influenced to the
point of prejudice by the news media.
B. The crime may have been one of a revolting nature such as
rape or a sex act against a child. There is little doubt that the ac-
cused would be unable to get a sympathetic jury. It is most probable
that he would get a jury that was prejudiced against him. The sit-
uation is magnified when the accused is a Negro and the victim a
white person. The Negro, in such a situation, rarely feels that he has
a chance of getting a fair jury trial. Consequently, it is this type of
case that brings most of the requests for waiver.
C. The victim may have been a prominent member of the com-
munity, in which case public opinion is apt to run high. One or two
of the jurors who held the person in high esteem might be able to
sway the undecided jurors. Thus, there is the strong possibility that
the accused will be convicted on the basis of the victim's social
status.
a3 Bond, "The Maryland Practice of Allowing Defendants in Criminal Cases
to Choose a Trial Before a Judge or a Jury Trial," 6 Mass. L. Q. 89, 95 (1921).
[Vol. 48,
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D. The accused may have something in his past life, his repu-
tation or appearance likely to arouse prejudice against him in the
minds of the jurors. Perhaps a previous criminal conviction has made
him well known in the community. Perhaps he merely has a "shifty"
look or certain physical characteristics that would cause the jury
to believe anything bad said against him. Such a situation calls
to mind the jury which supposedly found an accused innocent of the
specific crime charged but sentenced him to prison anyhow, because
"he would have committed the crime had he been present and afforded
the opportunity."
From the Standpoint of the State
The primary interest of the state is to administer justice in the
most efficient manner. If the accused feels that his interests are better
protected without a jury, certainly it would be in the interest of
justice to permit him to forego the jury. Further, for reasons stated
supra there are situations in which justice demands that there be no
jury. Also, cases tried without a jury can be decided faster and with
less cost. Time ordinarily spent in impanelling a jury can be utilized
in hearing the case. Consequently, more cases can be handled in
the same length of time. While the cost factor is important, it should
be noted that great consideration should be given to the judge in
waiver cases. His time spent in the courtroom would be reduced,
but other aspects of his workload may be increased. For example it
would be his sole responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses.
In certain cases this added responsibility may be more than some
judges would want to accept.33 But, the judge should not be per-
mitted to prevent waiver. If trial by jury is to be a privilege that the
accused may waive, it is inconsistent to require the judge to consent
before the right of waiver can be exercised.
33 In a memorandum opinion to a personal injury case in California, thejudge had this to say about hearing the case without a jury:
The plaintiff has been grievously injured, possibly maimed for life
and the court was certainly disposed to grant him relief if it could
be fairly done within the law and the facts that had been presented.
What really happened on that unfortunate night is largely vested
in smoke and I cannot honestly say who, if anyone, was at fault. ...
There is another comment which I desire to make about this
case. While my conscience has compelled me to find for the de-
fendants, I think that a case such as this should never be tried by
one man. It is peculiarly the sort of case that calls for the focus of
a dozen laymen s point of view. Judge Curtis Bok, I think, summed
the matter up very well when he said, "I am inclined to think that the
use of a jury, which is a community in microcosm, is more consistent
with our way of life than the use of a single man when it comes to
the decision of cases that affect the deep concern of litigants." Quoted
in 1 Belli, Modem Trials 777 (1954).
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CONCLUSION
A state, by forcing an accused to have his case tried by a jury,
does not ensure that he will be tried fairly. The jury may be sus-
ceptible to many prejudices, some of which are perceptible by the
accused or his counsel. Therefore, an accused, properly represented
by counsel, should be permitted in all criminal prosecutions to be
heard and sentenced by a judge without a jury if he so elects.
Billy R. Paxton
